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Abstract: The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) can model transactions among individuals in a 
population, including human cooperation and trust. Research has focused on equilibrium solutions, 
mutual cooperation and mutual defection, in IPD. The non-equilibrium strategy profile that one 
player cooperates and the opponent defects is considered to be unstable and temporal. In this 
research, we show that non-equilibrium strategies can also be dominant in spatial IPD. An example 
of such non-equilibrium strategy is a so-called Collective Strategy with Master-Slave Mechanism 
(CSMSM). A CSMSM identifies the opponent by playing a fixed sequence of moves in the first five 
rounds of IPD. If the opponent has played the same sequence of moves, it is identified as a kin 
member. Otherwise it is identified as non-kin. A CSMSM always defects against non-kins. There 
are two roles in the CSMSM group, master and slave. Every CSMSM acts as a master initially. A 
master may change to a slave with a predefined probability in each generation. When two CSMSMs 
meet, they will cooperate with each other if both are masters. In the case that one is a master and 
another is a slave, the slave will cooperate and the master will defect so that the master’s payoff is 
maximized. Simulation results show that CSMSM outperforms well known strategies like Tit-For-
Tat and Always Defect in spatial IPD even if there are only a small ratio of CSMSM in the initial 
population.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two-player non-zero-sum game in which two players try to 
maximize their payoffs by cooperating with or betraying the other player. In the classical version of 
prisoner’s dilemma, each player chooses between two strategies, Cooperate (C) and Defect (D). 
Their payoffs can be represented by the matrix shown in Figure 1. 
In the payoff matrix, R, S, T, and P denote Reward for mutual cooperation, Sucker's payoff, 
  
Player II 
  Cooperate Defect 
Player I 
Cooperate R, R S, T 
Defect T, S P, P 
 
Fig. 1.  Payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
  
Temptation to defect, and Punishment for mutual defection respectively, and T > R > P > S. The 
constraint motivates each player to play non-cooperatively. 
When both players are rational and they make their choice independently, the theoretical 
outcome of the game is a Nash equilibrium, in which both players choose to defect, and each 
receives a 'Punishment for mutual defection'. It is worse for each player than the outcome they 
would have received if they had cooperated. [1,2] 
In the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), two players have to choose their mutual strategy 
repeatedly, and they also have memory of their previous behaviors and the behaviors of the 
opponents. There is R > 1 2(S +T), which is set to prevent any incentive to alternate between 
cooperation and defection. IPD is considered to be an ideal experimental platform for the 
evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals and it has attracted wide interest since Robert 
Axelrod’s IPD tournaments and his book ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’[3].  
If the precise length of an IPD is known to the players, the optimal strategy for both players is 
to defect on each move. This is deduced by means of so-called backward induction: Both players 
will choose to defect in the final iteration because the opponent will not be able to subsequently 
punish the player. Given mutual defection in the final iteration, the optimal strategy in the 
penultimate iteration is defection for both players, and so on, back to the initial iteration. If the 
precise length of an IPD is infinite or unknown, mutual cooperation can also be an equilibrium. 
Axelrod was the first to attempt to search for efficient strategies by means of IPD competitions 
[4, 5]. TFT always cooperates in the first move and then mimics whatever the opponent did in the 
previous move. According to Axelrod, several characteristics make TFT successful: TFT is Nice, 
Retaliating and Forgiving. TFT is not a Nash equilibrium and there is always a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium that dominates TFT, according to the Folk Theorem in game theory [6, 7]. On the other 
hand, whether or not TFT is the most efficient strategy in IPD is still unclear. Some strategies 
perform better than TFT in specific environments [8-12]. Therefore, researchers are attempting to 
develop novel strategies that can outperform TFT either in round-robin tournaments or in 
evolutionary dynamics. 
In recent IPD competitions, strategies have appeared with identification mechanisms. With a rule-
based identification mechanism, a strategy called APavlov won competition four of the 2005 IPD 
competition [13]. Furthermore, many of the top listed strategies somehow explore the opponent by 
using simple mechanisms [14, 15]. This shows that strategies that explore and then exploit the 
opponent can outperform any single non-group strategy in round-robin IPD tournaments.  
A strategy with a simple identification mechanism, named ‘handshake’ [16], appeared in 
evolutionary IPD. This strategy defects at the first move and cooperates on the second move. If the 
opponent behaves in the same way as handshake, it will keep cooperating in the following moves. 
Otherwise, it will always defect. This ‘initial defect then cooperate’ can be seen as a password. 
Any strategy that knows this password (or behaves the same by chance) may evoke handshake’s 
cooperation while others trigger defection. By means of a mechanism like ‘handshake’, a group of 
strategies are able to recognize each other and then behave collectively [17, 18]. 
In the 2004 IPD competition, a team from Southampton University led by Jennings introduced 
a group of strategies, which outperformed all singleton strategies, and won the top three positions. 
These strategies were designed to recognize each other through a predetermined sequence of 5-10 
moves at the start. Once two Southampton players recognized each other, they would act as a 
'master' or 'slave' - a master will always defect while a slave will always cooperate in order for the 
master to win the maximum points. If the opponent was recognized as not being a Southampton 
entry, it would immediately defect to minimize the score of the opponent [19]. The importance of 
group strategies lies in their evolutionary features. A simple group strategy that just cooperates 
with kin members and defects against any non-kin could be strong in maintaining a stable 
population in evolution [20, 21]. Recent surveys on IPD and the introduction of some group 
strategies appearing in recent IPD competitions can be found in [22, 23]. 
The Southampton strategies were designed to maximize the payoffs of a small number of 
masters so that they could win in a round robin IPD tournament. The slaves performed poorly and 
they generally received less payoffs than their opponents. This master-slave scheme is ineffective 
in evolutionary dynamics because the slaves quickly die out and then the masters lose the 
advantage of exploiting the slaves. 
The effect of the structure of the population on evolutionary dynamics is taken into 
consideration in a spatial PD or IPD. Each strategy has its position and only plays IPD with its 
immediate neighbours, as shown in Fig. 2. After interactions between neighbours, each site is 
occupied either by its original owner or by one of the neighbours, depending on who scores the 
highest total payoff in interacting with its neighbours [24]. It is well accepted that the spatial 
structure promotes cooperation, compared with the evolution process under replicator dynamics 
[25-31]. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Spatial IPD. There are n×n strategies located on a n×n grid. Each strategy has a position and only plays IPD with its direct 
neighbours. After interactions between neighbours, each site is occupied by the strategy who receives the highest payoff in the 
neighbourhood. 
 
In this paper, we show that a novel strategy, so-called Collective Strategy with Master-Slave 
Mechanism (CSMSM), dominates in spatial IPD. CSMSM outperforms other IPD strategies when 
they form clusters. Simulation results show that CSMSM always expels the opponent when its 
percentage in the initial population is greater than a small value.   
The existence and success of CSMSM in spatial IPD reveals that non-equilibrium strategies, 
which have long been ignored in research, are non-trivial in an evolutionary context, especially in 
winner-take-all environments. The evolution process may be more complicated than what we have 
expected if non-equilibrium strategies are taken into consideration. 
The rest of paper is arranged as follows. Section two introduces the handshaking and master-
slave mechanisms that a CSMSM uses. Section three presents an analysis of CSMSM interacting 
with two typical strategies TFT and AllD. Also, simulation results on CSMSM competing against 
some well-known IPD strategies are given. Section four concludes the paper.   
 
2. Collective strategies with a master-slave mechanism 
 
Based on hand-shaking, a group of strategies can recognize each other and deal with 
group members and non-members differently. Hand-shaking in IPD is a predefined sequence 
of moves for two interacting players. If both players play the same sequence of moves, they 
recognize each other as group members. Otherwise, they identify the opponent as non-kin.  
The hand-shaking of CSMSM is the sequence of ‘CDCCD’. When two CSMSMs meet, they 
will play this sequence in the first five moves and then recognize each other as a group member. If 
the opponent has played a different sequence, this immediately triggers defection and a CSMSM 
will always defect against the opponent from that point on. 
As long as two CSMSMs have identified each other, they will play either a master or a slave 
role. Every CSMSM behaves as a master originally. In each generation, a master CSMSM may 
change to a slave with a predefined probability (it is set to be 0.7 in this study), which makes sure 
that there is always a ratio of slaves in the CSMSM group. Because the slaves are designed to 
sacrifice themselves in order for the masters to maximize their payoffs, they are likely to receive 
lower payoff than the average of the population and then they die out in each generation. Thus, the 
percentage of slaves in CSMSM will be approximately 70% when the probability of a master 
changing to a slave is set to be 0.7. A slave will always be a slave. Later in this paper we will 
discuss the impact of this value on the performance of CSMSM. 
As long as two CSMSMs have identified each other, a master will act as a Grim trigger (it 
chooses ‘C’ as long as the opponent chooses ‘C’. Once the opponent has chosen ‘D’, it always 
defects) and a slave will act as a reverse TFT (it chooses ‘D’ first and then chooses the reverse of 
the opponent’s previous choice) in interacting with other CSMSM. When a master and a slave 
meet, the master chooses ‘C’ and the slave chooses ‘D’ in the sixth move, and then the master will 
always play ‘D’ and the slave will always play ‘C’ so that the master’s payoff is maximized.  
When two masters meet, they will cooperate with each other except handshaking in the first 
five moves. When two slaves meet, they will play a sequence of alternate defection and 
cooperation after handshaking.  
As an example, let’s consider how a CSMSM interacts with a TFT. Both strategies play ‘C’ in 
the first move. Then TFT plays ‘C’ and CSMSM plays ‘D’ in the second move. Since TFT has not 
played the handshaking sequence, CSMSM will play ‘D’ thereafter. They will keep defecting from 
the third move on. 
When CSMSM forms a cluster in the population, they outperform any individual strategy. In 
the next section, we analyse the performance of CSMSM in spatial IPD game.  
 
3. CSMSM in spatial IPD 
 
As a collective strategy, the performance of CSMSM in a spatial IPD depends on the size of 
the clusters they form. Whenever CSMSM has formed a cluster of significant size, they will 
outperform their competitors.  
 
3.1 CSMSM vs. TFT 
Let’s first consider a typical scenario that a cluster of nine CSMSM is surrounded by TFTs, as 
shown in Fig.3a. The minimum size of a cluster for CSMSM to survive in a population of TFT is 
nine. Let n (n>6) denote the number of iterations in the IPD. 
 
       
(a)                        (b)  
Figure 3 (a) a cluster of nine CSMSMs is surrounded by a population of TFT. (b) A master on border 
who has four or five slaves as direct neighbours receives the highest payoff in the local area, and thus it 
will invade the TFT territory. 
 
A TFT receives R+(n-2)P+S in interacting with a CSMSM and receives nR against 
another TFT. A master CSMSM receives T+R+(n-2)P against a TFT, (n-2)R+2P against a 
master, and (n-6)T+3R+2P+S against a slave. 
Without self-interaction, each strategy plays eight IPDs with its direct neighbours. A TFT 
may have zero, one, two, or three CSMSM neighbours depending on its position. With zero 
CSMSM and eight TFT neighbours, a TFT receives T0 = 8nR payoff. With one, two, or three 
CSMSM neighbours, the payoff of a TFT is T1 = 7nR +(R+(n-2)P+S), T2 = 6nR +2×(R+(n-
2)P+S), or T3 = 5nR +3×(R+(n-2)P+S) respectively. There are T1 >T2 >T3 since R >P >S. 
For CSMSM, we only need to consider the payoffs of the masters because the slaves 
generally receive lower payoffs than TFTs. Depending on the position of a master, it may 
have three, five, or eight CSMSM neighbours. 
 
(a) Firstly, let’s consider the scenario that the centre of the cluster of nine CSMSM is a 
master. Let m (8 ≥ 𝑚 ≥ 0) denote the number of slaves in the cluster. The payoff of the 
master can be computed by C0 = m((n-6)T+3R+2P+S)+(8-m)((n-2)R+2P). We have 
C0 > T1                 (1) 
when 𝑛 >
17𝑅−18𝑃+𝑆
𝑅−𝑃
 and whatever value of m is. The payoff of the central master is the 
highest within the 5x5 area when the number of iterations is long enough, for example 𝑛 >
16 when R=3, P=1, S=0. Thus, the cluster of CSMSM cannot be invaded by TFT if the 
central strategy is a master. 
 
(b) Secondly, let’s consider the scenario that a master is located on one side border of the 
cluster (with five CSMSM neighbours). Let l (5 ≥ 𝑙 ≥ 0) denote the number of slaves in the 
five CSMSM neighbours. The payoff can be computed as C1 = l((n-6)T+3R+2P+S)+(5-l) 
((n-2)R+2P)+3×(T+R+(n-2)P). In order that C1 > T0, we have 
𝑙 >
3𝑛(𝑅−𝑃)−3𝑇+7𝑅−4𝑃
𝑛(𝑇−𝑅)−6𝑇+5𝑅+𝑆
              (2) 
In the case that T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0 and n=50, (2) can be computed as 𝑙 > 3.55. It means 
that the master receives greater payoff than the highest payoff of TFT if l=4 or 5. The three 
TFT neighbours will be replaced by CSMSM, as shown in Fig. 3b. 
In the case that n is far greater than T, n>50 for example, (2) can be simplified to (3). 
𝑙 >
3(𝑅−𝑃)
𝑇−𝑅
                (3) 
Under the condition of (2) or (3), the cluster of CSMSM grows in size. 
In the case that T0 > C1 > T1, we have, 
3𝑛(𝑅−𝑃)−3𝑇+7𝑅−4𝑃
𝑛(𝑇−𝑅)−6𝑇+5𝑅+𝑆
> 𝑙 >
2𝑛(𝑅−𝑃)−3𝑇+8𝑅−6𝑃+𝑆
𝑛(𝑇−𝑅)−6𝑇+5𝑅+𝑆
         (4) 
It can be simplified to (5) when n is a relatively large value. 
 
3(𝑅−𝑃)
𝑇−𝑅
> 𝑙 >
2(𝑅−𝑃)
𝑇−𝑅
              (5) 
Under the condition of (4) or (5), the payoff of the master is higher than its TFT 
neighbours and lower than the highest payoff of TFT. Thus, the cluster of CSMSM will 
maintain the current size. 
 
(c) Thirdly, in the scenario that a master locates on one corner of the cluster (with three 
CSMSM neighbours), the payoff is C2 = q((n-6)T+3R+2P+S)+(3-q)((n-2)R+2P)+ 
5×(T+R+(n-2)P), where q (3 ≥ 𝑞 ≥ 0) is the number of slaves in the three CSMSM 
neighbours. It can be verified that C2 is always smaller than T2 . Thus, a master on the corner 
always receives lower payoff than its TFT neighbours.  
In summary, if there is a master on the border and the number of its slave neighbours 
satisfies (2) or (3), the neighbour TFTs will be replaced by CSMSM and the cluster of 
CSMSM grows. Otherwise, if the centre of the cluster is a master, or there is a master on the 
border and (4) or (5) satisfies, the cluster will maintain the current size. In other situations, the 
cluster of CSMSM may be invaded by TFT. 
In the case that T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0 and n=50, the ratio of slaves in CSMSM should be at 
least 60% so that there are approximately three slaves in the neighbourhood of a master on 
border, which makes sure that the border cannot be invaded by TFT. If the ratio of slaves can 
be maintained higher than 60%, CSMSM outperforms TFT in spatial IPD. 
The result of a simulation of CSMSM competing against TFT is shown in Fig.4, where 
the initial population is 50% TFT and 50% CSMSM, randomly allocated on a 200×200 grid. 
The changes of the percentages of two strategies in the population and average payoffs are 
illustrated in Fig. 5(a) and (b) respectively. It shows that the masters outperform TFT 
decreases rapidly and it dies out after 13 generations. 
 
3.2 CSMSM vs. AllD 
We now consider another scenario that a cluster of two CSMSM is surrounded by AllDs, as 
shown in Fig. 6a. Each CSMSM has seven AllD and one CSMSM neighbours. An AllD may have 
zero, one, or two CSMSM neighbours. 
     
Generation 1          Generation 2          Generation 3           Generation 4 
     
Generation 5          Generation 6              Generation 7        Generation 8 
Figure 4 CSMSM defeats TFT in a spatial IPD. The initial population contains 50% CSMSM and 50% 
TFT. The dark colour squares denote CSMSM while the light colour denotes TFT. 
 
   
(a)                          (b) 
Figure 5 (a) The percentage of CSMSM and TFT. The x-axis denotes generation and y-axis denotes the 
ratio of strategies in the population. (b) The average payoff per move of masters, slaves, TFT, and all 
CSMSM. 
            
(a)                      (b)     (c) 
Figure 6 (a) a cluster of two CSMSMs is surrounded by a population of AllD. (b) If there are one master 
and one slave, the master receives higher payoff than surrounding AllDs and thus it will invade the AllD 
territory. (c) If there are two masters (or two slaves), the masters (or slaves) receive higher payoff than 
surrounding AllD. 
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Figure 7 CSMSM outperforms some well-known strategies. The initial population is 20% CSMSM and 
80% another strategy. The x-axis denotes generation and y-axis denotes the ratio of strategies in the 
population. (a) CSMSM vs. AllC. (b) CSMSM vs. AllD. (c) CSMSM vs. TFT. (d) CSMSM vs. TFTT. 
TFTT: Tit for two tat. (e) CSMSM vs. Grim trigger. (f) CSMSM vs. Adaptive. Adaptive: it starts with 
C,C,C,C,C,C,D,D,D,D,D and then takes choices which have given the best average score re-calculated 
after every move. 
 
An AllD receives T+(n-1)P in interacting with a CSMSM and receives nP against another 
AllD. A master CSMSM receives (n-1)P+S against an AllD, (n-2)R+2P against a master, and 
(n-6)T+3R+2P+S against a slave. A slave receives (n-1)P+S against an AllD, T+3R+2P+(n-
6)S against a master, and (nR+nP)/2 against a slave. 
With zero, one, and two CSMSM neighbours, the payoff of an AllD are 8nP, 7nP +(T+(n-
1)P), and 6nP +2×(T+(n-1)P) respectively. The greatest of three values is D2 = 8nP+2T-2P. 
If two CSMSMs are a master and a slave, the master receives 7×((n-1)P+S)+ ((n-6)T+3R 
+2P+S) and the slave receives 7×((n-1)P+S)+ (T+3R+2P+(n-6)S). The payoff of the master 
is higher than D2, the highest payoff of AllD, when there is 
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𝑛 >
8𝑇−3𝑅+3𝑃−2𝑆
𝑇−𝑃
               (6) 
In the case that T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0 for example, there is n>8.5. Under this condition, the 
AllD neighbours around the master will be replaced by CSMSM, as shown in Fig. 4b. 
If both CSMSMs are masters, their payoff is 7×((n-1)P+S)+ ((n-2)R+2P) and it is higher 
than D2 when (6) is satisfied. If both CSMSMs are slaves, their payoff is 7×((n-1)P+S)+ 
(nR+nP) /2 and it is higher than D2 as well. Thus, the AllDs in the neighbourhood of the two 
CSMSMs will be replaced, as shown in Fig. 4c. Thus, a cluster of two or more CSMSM 
outperforms AllD in spatial IPD.  
 
3.3 CSMSM invades a population of another strategy 
We have simulated CSMSM competing against some well-known strategies in spatial 
IPD. The results are given in Fig. 7. The initial population in each simulation contains 20% 
CSMSM and 80% another strategy, randomly mixed and allocated on a 200×200 grid. In all 
simulations, CSMSM outperforms the opponent strategy in 200 generations.  
As an example, the process of competition between CSMSM and TFT in a spatial IPD is 
shown in Fig. 8. The numbers of CSMSM decreases sharply at the beginning stage because 
they have not formed clusters. Once small clusters appear, their percentage starts to increase. 
When CSMSM has formed clusters of significant sizes, they grow steadily in size and expel 
TFT as a result. 
For some other strategies like TFTT, Grim trigger, and Adaptive, similar process as Fig. 8 
can be observed.  
For some naive strategies like AllC, AllD, and Random player, CSMSM expels them in 3-
5 generations because it does not need clusters of significant size to invade the territory of 
those strategies.  
 
    
Generation 1      Generation 2         Generation 5     Generation 10 
    
Generation 15          Generation 30         Generation 50     Generation 100 
Figure 8 CSMSM outperforms TFT when the initial population is 20% CSMSM and 80% TFT. The dark 
colour squares denote CSMSM while the light colour denotes TFT. 
 4. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We have presented a CSMSM strategy that outperforms well-known strategies such as 
TFT in spatial IPD. By means of a handshaking and a master-slave mechanism, CSMSM 
manages to maximize the masters’ payoffs and minimize the opponents’ payoffs. Spatial IPD 
simulations show that CSMSM outperforms other strategies even if it is minority in the initial 
population. Once CSMSM has formed a cluster of significant size, it will dominate in the 
evolution as a result. 
The replicator equation (7) is the most commonly used model in evolutionary game 
theory.  
?̇?𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖[𝑓𝑖(𝑥) − 𝜙(𝑥)], 𝜙(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑓𝑗(𝑥)
𝑛
𝑗=1        (7) 
It has been revealed that a stable rest point of the equation is also a Nash equilibrium [32], 
so stable states in evolutionary games can be predicted by means of the folk theorems [33]. 
Our research shows that if an evolutionary process is not as simple as the replicator equation 
models, the stable states are not necessarily Nash equilibria.  
The master-slave mechanism and handshaking have been neglected in game theory 
research. One reason may be that they do not follow the assumption of self-interest players, so 
they cannot be well explained by means of Nash equilibrium. Handshaking provides a method 
for those players who have the same objective to recognize each other and to coordinate their 
choices. The master-slave mechanism provides a method for the same strategies to win in a 
winner-take-all environment. There is still a need for a theory for these kinds of behaviours. 
The master-slave mechanism specially fits for winner-take-all situations. It is 
economically reasonable only when the winning of a master is enough to compensate the loss 
of the slaves who are sacrificed. In a winner-take-all situation, a master-slave strategy profile 
can be profitable for a group of individuals, especially in an evolutionary context.  
Note that CSMSM never coexists with any other strategy unless that strategy behaves in 
the same way as a CSMSM. This feature makes CSMSM especially strong in maintaining a 
homogeneous population in evolution. A game theoretical model that provides explanations 
for interactive strategies like CSMSM will be our future research.  
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